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Inherent Jurisdiction
Counsel for the dockyard dockyard also put forward an alternative jurisdictional argument, based on the structure and terms of Article 22 of the contract. The argument was directed to invoking the court’s original jurisdiction on an inherent basis. It was to the effect that an appeal on the facts was not expressly prohibited by the 1996 Act, was consistent (where the parties had agreed to it) with party autonomy, and fell within the court’s inherent jurisdiction, just like a claim for breach of contract. In other words, the appeal to the court was essentially contractual in nature and therefore part of the arbitration process, rather than an “intervention” (see s.1(c) of the 1996 Act) in the process by the court.
However, the judge was not convinced. The judge held that “… it is clear that under English law (to adopt the phrase used by Mustill J in Finelvet AG v Vinava Shipping Co Ltd - The “Chrysalis” [1984] 1 W.L.R 1469) it is very doubtful that the court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from arbitrators on questions of fact, even if the parties were to agree to such an appeal. As in The Chrysalis, it is only necessary to go further than that if the parties here did agree to an appeal on the facts.”