GTLK Malta Four Ltd v Pola Maritime Ltd & Ors

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DMC/SandT/26/19

England

GTLK Malta Four Ltd v Pola Maritime Ltd & Ors (The “Luft 1”, “Luft 2”, “Sea Gull”, “Orion”, “Hercules”, “Barge 1905” and “Barge 1906”)

English Commercial Court: Lesley Anderson KC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court): [2026] EWHC 2514 (Comm): 2 October 2026

Judgment Available on BAILII @ https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2026/2514.html

Robert Thomas KC and Koye Akoni (instructed by Freshfields LLP) for GTLK (Owners)

Steven Berry KC and Joseph Rich (instructed by MFB Solicitors Ltd) for Pola and others (Charterers’ Guarantors)

PERFORMANCE GUARANTEES: BAREBOAT CHARTERS: BARECON 2001 FORM: 10-YEAR CHARTERS WITH ‘HELL AND HIGHWATER’ CLAUSES BACKED BY 12 ‘ON DEMAND’ GUARANTEES UNDER WHICH GUARANTORS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE, AGREED AS PART OF FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR PURCHASE OF SEVEN VESSELS: OWNERS TEMPORARILY AFFECTED BY IMMEDIATE AND ULTIMATE PARENT COMPANIES’ DESIGNATIONS UNDER UK, US & EU SANCTIONS: CHARTERERS TEMPORARILY UNABLE TO PERFORM ALL OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHARTERS INCLUDING PAYING HIRE WHEN DUE AND MAINTAINING MANDATORY INSURANCES ON VESSELS: ‘HELL AND HIGHWATER’ CLAUSES ALLOCATED ENTIRE RISK OF LOSS OF USE OF VESSELS TO CHARTERERS: CHARTERERS ALLEGED CHARTERS WERE FRUSTRATED AND PURPORTED TO TERMINATE FOR OWNERS’ BREACH: WHETHER OWNERS ENTITLED TO TERMINATE CHARTERS WHEN HIRE LATER COULD BE BUT WAS NOT PAID WHEN IT FELL DUE, AND TO DEMAND PURCHASE OPTION PRICE DUE ON TERMINATION FROM GUARANTORS UNDER GUARANTEES: WHETHER GUARANTORS HAD DEFENCES OF FRUSTRATION OR LAWFUL TERMINATION BY CHARTERERS OF CHARTERS: OWNERS SEEKING SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES PART 24: WHETHER GUARANTORS HAD “NO REAL PROSPECT OF SUCCESS ON THE DEFENCE OR ISSUE” AND THERE WAS “NO OTHER COMPELLING REASON WHY THE CASE OR ISSUE SHOULD BE DISPOSED OF AT TRIAL”

Summary

The High Court, in granting summary judgment under Civil Procedure Rules Part 24 in Owners’ favour under the guarantees of the charters, held that:

(1)  Guarantors had no real prospect of proving that they were not liable under the terms of the guarantees, properly construed, because they were ‘on demand’ guarantees, which required Guarantors, as principal obligors, to pay any amount not paid by Charterers when due promptly, and in any event within three business days of demand, including when the obligation guaranteed was unenforceable, invalid or illegal as against Charterers.  This meant that Owners did not have to prove Charterers’ liability under the charters in arbitration before being able to enforce the guarantees;

(2)  Guarantors had no real prospect of establishing their underlying case on the frustration of, or the right of Charterers to, terminate the charters, primarily because the ‘hell and highwater’ clauses had excluded the doctrine of frustration and the right to terminate when Owners became affected by sanctions.  These clauses had allocated to Charterers the entire risk of loss of use of the vessels due to impossibility and illegality of performance; the covenant of quiet enjoyment in the charters, properly construed, was held to be a qualified, rather than an absolute, obligation on Owners;

(3)  Hence, Charterers were in repudiatory breach of the charters, having alleged that they became frustrated and then also having purported to terminate them (and then later failed to pay hire when due once Owners were no longer affected by their parent companies’ sanctions designations).  Owners had accepted the breach as terminating the charters, in which event they were entitled to the purchase option price, given that the charters were part of financing arrangements to purchase the vessels; and

(4)  There was also no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at trial, because the possibility of additional or better evidence becoming available at trial was remote or speculative.

As a result, Guarantors were liable to Owners under the guarantees for the purchase option price of the vessels, as agreed in each of the seven charters, for sums claimed in excess of USD40 million, together with interest and costs.

Case note contributed by Jim Leighton, LLM (Maritime Law), LLB (Hons), BSc (Hons), Solicitor Advocate of England & Wales, IMI Registered Mediator, LMAA Supporting Member and Deputy Editor of DMC’s CaseNotes

Background

Owners (GTLK Malta Ltd, a Maltese company) were registered owners of seven vessels.  The vessels were bareboat chartered to Charterers (Pola Logistics Ltd, a Cypriot company) for a period of 10 years commencing between February 2018 and April 2020.  The charters were part of financing arrangements for the purchase of the vessels. The charters were guaranteed, under 12 joint deeds of guarantee and indemnity, by Pola Maritime Ltd (Charterers’ parent company) and three other companies related to the Pola group of companies.

Owners were part of the Russian Federation’s “State Transport Leasing Company” group, ultimately owned by JSC GTLK in Russia, with their direct owner parent company being GTLK Europe DAC (an Irish company).

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Owners’ ultimate and direct parent companies were designated, on 8 and 21 April and 20 August 2022, under UK, US and EU sanctions. Owners were not directly subject to sanctions. However, Owners’ ability to operate their business was affected.  Further, the sanctions designations also had an adverse effect on Charterers’ ability to pay the hire to Owners as and when it fell due and to maintain mandatory P&I insurance (which was automatically terminated on 8 April 2022), among various other important obligations, under the charters.

Charterers alleged that the charters had become frustrated by the sanctions and also purported to terminate the charters on 1 September 2022, on the basis that Owners were in serious breach. Owners later rejected the purported termination and asserted that the charters continued in effect on 7 February 2023.

In due course, Owners’ direct owner parent company was placed into voluntary liquidation in Ireland on 31 May 2023, following which they were under the control of Irish insolvency practitioners.  As a result, Owners were - according to an Irish High Court declaration - no longer affected by their parent companies’ sanctions designations. The UK issued a general licence on 1 August 2023.  The US also issued specific licences on 18 September 2023 (and thereafter extended them in 2024 and 2025).  So, Charterers’ obligation to pay hire again fell due.

Following Charterers' persistent failure to pay the hire when due, following the declaration, Owners finally accepted Charterers’ conduct as a repudiatory or renunciatory breach of the charters, by giving notice to terminate them on 28 February 2024.  Owners then demanded the payment of the purchase option price of each vessel that was due on termination, and demanded payment under the guarantees.

Guarantors having failed to pay within the three business days required by the guarantees or at all, Owners commenced proceedings in the English High Court, in accordance with the dispute resolution agreement in the guarantees. Owners sought summary judgment premised on there being no defence to their claims under the guarantees, by reference to their terms, or those of the charters.

Judgment

The Judge outlined the key facts and terms of the charters and the guarantees, addressed the test that needed to be satisfied to grant summary judgment, and summarised the relevant law on frustration and termination of contracts.

She noted that, by the time of the hearing, the parties’ submissions were directed to four main issues, namely:

(1) The true interpretation of the terms of the guarantees, including whether they applied even if there had been frustration or termination of the charters;

(2) Whether, if the charters were not frustrated, there was a real prospect of Guarantors establishing Charterers had lawfully terminated the charters on 1 September 2022;

(3) Whether there was a real prospect of Guarantors establishing that the charters had been frustrated by impossibility or impracticability or discharged by supervening illegality in 2022; and

(4) Whether, if the charters survived, Owners were able to prove Charterers’ hire payment obligations had been restored on 18 September 2023, such that the hire was due and remained unpaid on 28 February 2024, the date on which Owners in turn terminated the charters on the grounds of Charterers’ serious breach.

Another issue in dispute arose during the hearing: the true nature of the charters.  The Judge decided, on hearing the parties’ submissions, that they were ‘finance charters’.  This was at the heart of the way the charters allocated the risk of loss of use of the vessels, specifically through the ‘hell and highwater’ clause in clause 38.10 (fn.1).  More generally, the Judge was satisfied that she should interpret the charters and guarantees in their commercial context, which was as part of a suite or package of documents that should be considered together.

Her analysis began with (1) above, on the interpretation of the guarantee terms (fn.2), because whether the guarantees responded to Guarantors’ case on frustration and/or termination in any event was of central, determinative, importance, given that it was Owners’ interpretation that the guarantees responded whether or not the charters were frustrated or terminated.

The Judge considered that Guarantors’ arguments had no real prospect of success, essentially because the effect of clause 38.10 of the charters was to allocate the entire risk of the unavailability or inability to use the vessels to Charterers, which was consistent with them being ‘finance charters’. The fact that there was no express reference to sanctions or their consequences in clause 38.10 made no difference, because its wording was in the broadest terms.

The Judge also accepted that the underlying commercial rationale was that Guarantors would bear the risks associated with Charterers’ failure to repay the loan even if it could not be enforced legally or practically against Charterers.  This, again, was consistent with the purpose of the charters as ‘finance charters’. This meant Guarantors had no real prospect of success because, even if there were an arguable case on frustration, the guarantees would still respond.

Further, the Judge was of the view that, even if Guarantors had an arguable case that Charterers had lawfully terminated the charters, the guarantees responded to that situation too.  This was because the guarantees made no distinction between “accrued” and “unaccrued” obligations in their wording.  This was consistent with observations in case law (fn.3) that it did not matter how the underlying obligation had become unenforceable and even if there was no longer any underlying right.  Moreover, an argument to the contrary could not be reconciled with the broad waiver of defences in the guarantees.  This reflected Guarantors being obliged to pay amounts “as if it were principal obligor” and agreeing to indemnify Owners “as an independent and primary obligation”.

Hence, the Judge held that Owners were right to say that once there was a failure to pay hire, Owners were entitled to terminate, under clause 28(a) of the charter, and Guarantors then stood in the shoes of Charterers and were obliged to pay the purchase option price under clause 46.2 (fn.4). Further, clause 38.10 provided expressly that the obligation to pay hire survived a cause which might, but for that provision, have the effect of terminating the relevant obligation.  So, the obligation to pay hire would survive a repudiatory breach by Owners.  The result was that Guarantors had no reasonable prospect of arguing that the guarantees did not also respond in the event of the charters being terminated.

Accordingly, the issues under (2), (3) and (4) above were academic.  In any event, because clause 38.10 of the charters allocated risk of loss of use to Charterers, there was no room for the doctrine of frustration to apply.  Guarantors were also unable to prove Owners were in breach of clause 42.1 (fn.5) of the charters, due to their parent companies’ sanctions designations, because the covenant of quiet enjoyment was not absolute; it was qualified by the allocation of contractual risk in other clauses of the charters.

Conclusion

In all the circumstances, the Judge considered summary judgment should be granted, because Guarantors had no real prospect of proving they were not liable under the guarantees.  There was no defence of frustration of the charters nor of their lawful termination available to Charterers, and there were no other compelling reasons why the case should be decided at trial.  Thus, Owners were entitled to the sums exceeding USD40 million claimed, together with interest and costs.

Comment

This judgment is useful to highlight, in the context of bareboat charters that are agreed as part of financing arrangements for the purchase of vessels, that guarantors may be expected to have limited, if any, grounds on which they are able to avoid liability or have any defence to the obligation to pay or indemnify the beneficiaries under the guarantees, even in extreme cases like this one.

This reflects that ownership of the vessels by financiers’ registered owners is simply a form of security, for payment under the financing arrangements, by enabling charterers to obtain good title to the vessels only after all payments due have been made, without any intention of owners taking any physical possession of or trading the vessels themselves.  This explains why provisions like ‘hell and highwater’ clauses are included in such charters, in order to places all risk of the loss of use of the vessels on charterers and, ultimately, their guarantors.

Footnote 1:

“38.10 Obligation absolute. The Charterers’ obligation to pay Charter Hire in accordance with the requirements of this Charter shall be absolute irrespective of any contingency whatsoever, including (but not limited to) (i) any set-off, counterclaim, recoupment, defence or other right which any party hereto may have against any other party hereto, (ii) any unavailability of the Vessel for any reason, including (but not limited to) condition, design, operation, performance, capacity or fitness for use of the Vessel or the ineligibility of the Vessel for any particular trade or for documentation under the laws of any country or of any damage to the Vessel, (iii) any failure or delay on the part of any party hereto or thereto, whether with or without fault on its part, in performing or complying with any of the terms or covenants hereunder (iv) any insolvency, bankruptcy, reorganisation, arrangement, readjustment of debt, dissolution, liquidation or similar proceedings by or against the Owners or the Charterers or the Guarantor or any other person or any change in the constitution of the Owners or the Charterers or the Guarantor or any other person, (v) any invalidity or unenforceability or lack of due authorisation of or other defect in the Charter, or (vi) any other cause which would or might but for this provision have the affect of terminating or in any way affecting any obligation of the Charterers under the Charter."

Footnote 2:

Clause 2 stated: “(a) guarantees to the Beneficiary the punctual performance by the Charterer of all of its obligations under the Transaction Documents (the “Guaranteed Obligations”);

(b) undertakes with the Beneficiary that whenever the Charterer does not pay any amount when due under or in connection with any Transaction Document, that Guarantor shall pay promptly and in any event within three (3) Business Days of written demand that amount as if it were the principal obligor; and

(c) agrees with the Beneficiary that if any obligation guaranteed by it is or becomes unenforceable, invalid or illegal, it will, as an independent and primary obligation, indemnify the Beneficiary promptly and in any event within three (3) Business Day of written demand against any cost, loss or liability it incurs as a result of the Charterer not paying any amount which would, but for such unenforceability, invalidity or illegality, have been payable by it under the Transaction Document on the date when it would have been due. The amount payable by a Guarantor under this indemnity will not exceed the amount it would have had to pay under this Deed if the amount claimed had been recoverable on the basis of a guarantee.”

Clause 5(f) stated: “The obligations of the Guarantor under this Deed will not be affected by an act, omission, matter or thing which, but for this Deed, would reduce, release or prejudice any obligations of any of the Guarantor under this Deed (without limitation and whether or not known to any of them or the Beneficiary) including: (f) any unenforceability, illegality or invalidity of any obligation of any person under any Transaction Document or any other document or security.”

Footnote 3:

Gulf Bank KSC v Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 145

Footnote 4:

Clause 46.2 stated: “Upon termination of this Charter as a result of a default of the Charterers under Clause 28(a), but not later than 15 (fifteen) Business Days from the date of such termination, the Buyers shall pay the Purchase Option Price to the Sellers applicable as at the month of such termination. In exchange for the Purchase Option Price the Sellers shall provide the documentation listed in Part IV (Hire/Purchase Agreement) hereof and shall transfer title to the Vessel free and clear of any security over the Vessel created by the Owner to Buyers and Buyers shall accept such transfer. For the avoidance of any doubt whatsoever, the Charterers shall not be obliged to pay the Purchase Option Price in the event the Vessel becomes a total loss or is declared as a constructive, compromised or arranged total loss. The Charterers shall however and do hereby indemnify the Owners in respect of any shortfall of the insurance proceeds as a result of such loss from policies arranged by the Charterers under this Charter but only to the extent that such shortfall is directly and solely the fault of and attributable to the actions (or omissions) of the Charterers. The Seller shall not sell the Vessel to any third party except any such party nominated by the Buyers unless the Buyers are in breach of this clause 46.2.”

Footnote 5:

“QUIET ENJOYMENT

42.1 Covenant. The Owners hereby covenant and undertake that so long as they shall have not lawfully commenced the exercise of any of their rights under or pursuant to Clause 28(a) of the Charter, neither the Charterers (nor any permitted sub-charterers) shall be disturbed or interfered with in their quiet and peaceful use, possession and enjoyment of the Vessel.”