Changes

Some of the key features for the application of the Monroe obligation were missing in this case. Further, determining the start point for the application of the obligation is not straightforward when reasonable certainty is desirable for commercial purposes. In this case, for example, the itinerary given in the CSSA charter included three port calls and one canal transit prior to an anticipated arrival at Rotterdam, with “estimated” dates of arrival at each prior port and at the canal. However, no reasonable allowance (to account for each port call date being an estimate only) had been contemplated for the almost inevitable delays (given the vagaries of trading in the maritime environment) that would realistically have arisen for so many prior port calls and the canal transit. Instead, the court jumped on the final port call ETA, as if this were a certainty -with no reasonable margin for a delayed arrival being allowed - and then added three days to allow for cargo discharge, without apparent reference to evidence about how long port calls usually take at Antifer. But, of course, on the facts of this case, it could be said that a more precise analysis was not required.

The parties But, of course, on the facts of this case, it could have chosen be said that a conventional formulation instead (for example, more precise analysis was not required. by inserting an expected ready to load date)If, had they so wishedhowever, there were a case where the delay prior to commencing the voyage to achieve a commercially certain result. But they chose the load port were not to do so extreme as here but still caused the charterer problems in this case. Soits loading schedule, the Court of Appeal decision (like charterer might find it difficult to determine with reasonable certainty when that of the High Court) could be viewed as going beyond, rather than simply giving effect toapproach voyage should have begun, if the CSSA charterparty in question contained a detailed pre-charter terms itinerary. Without determining that question, the charterer cannot know whether the owners were agreed. This is because the court adopted an overly-simplified exercise to consider what in breach and, in consequence, whether it would be a reasonable date at which the vessel had to commence her approach voyage to Rotterdam justified in order to be reasonably certain that she would arrive at Rotterdam on or around terminating the (presumed) expected readiness to load datecharter.

The parties could have chosen a conventional formulation instead (for example, by inserting an expected ready to load date), had they so wished, to achieve a commercially certain result. But they chose not to do so in this case. So, the Court of Appeal decision (like that of the High Court) could be viewed as going beyond, rather than simply giving effect to, the CSSA charter terms that were agreed. This is because the Court of Appeal adopted an overly-simplified exercise to consider what would be a reasonable date at which the vessel had to commence her approach voyage to Rotterdam in order to be reasonably certain that she would arrive there on or around the (presumed) expected readiness to load date. Without deciding the point, the Court of Appeal did at least cast doubt on the High Court’s acceptance of the alternative case, namely that the obligation to proceed with utmost despatch began to operate at the date when it could reasonably be expected that the vessel could arrive by the cancelling date. It was good that the Court of Appeal did express some reservation, because a cancelling date does not necessarily reflect actual expectations about when the vessel would realistically arrive at the port of loading. Such a date is merely an option to cancel without the need to show any fault by the owner. Such a date is often inserted in charters for other commercial reasons, reflecting the fact that cargo interests can have in their sale contracts strict obligations to load the cargo within a defined period of time.