Solong - Collision with Stena Immaculate

DMC/SandT/26/11

England

MS "Solong" Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG & Anor v Samskip Multimodal BV & Ors (The “Solong” and “Stena Immaculate”)

English Admiralty Court: Andrew Baker J: [2026] EWHC 1211 (Admlty): 22 May 2026

Judgment available on BAILII at https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admlty/2026/1211.html

Luke Parsons KC and Alex Carless (instructed by Stann Law Ltd) for Solong Interests

Stewart Buckingham KC and Saira Paruk (instructed by Campbell Johnston Clark Ltd) for Stena Interests

COLLISION: CONVENTION ON THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR MARITIME CLAIMS 1976 AS AMENDED BY THE 1996 PROTOCOL (“LLMC”): WHETHER OWNERS OF VESSEL CAUSING COLLISION BY MASTER’S GROSS NEGLIGENCE ENTITLED TO LIMIT LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 4 OF LLMC

DMC Classification: Developed

Summary

In this Limitation Claim brought by the owners of “Solong” (“Owners”), their right to limit liability under the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976, as amended by the 1996 Protocol (“LLMC”), following the vessel’s collision with the anchored tanker “Stena Immaculate”, was disputed. The dispute was brought by the owners and demise charterers of “Stena Immaculate”, Stena Bulk Marine Services LLC and Crowley Stena Marine Solutions LLC, respectively (“Stena Interests”), who relied on Article 4 of the LLMC.

The Admiralty Court considered that the dispute turned on the correct interpretation of Article 4 – see fn.1 for its wording. Owners contended (a) that the right to limitation was “virtually unbreakable” and that the gross negligence of the Master in this case was insufficient to break it, and (b) that the words “such loss” referred to “the very loss which…actually resulted and which is the subject-matter of the claim in which the right to limit is asserted”; Stena Interests, in turn, argued that “such loss” does not have such specific, restrictive meaning. The Judge preferred the latter view that “such loss” referred, less narrowly, to the type of loss that had occurred.

Ultimately, the Judge took the view that the Stena Interests had no reasonable prospect of establishing the level of culpability required of Owners by the provisions of Article 4 and therefore ruled out their defence to Owners’ limitation claim.

Note contributed by Alexandra Kosta-Foti, a Legal Researcher to Professor Yeginsu at 3 Verulam Buildings, a Visiting Lecturer in Contract Law and Equity and Trusts at King’s College London, Queen Mary University and City St. George’s University, a future pupil barrister at Quadrant Chambers, and International Contributor to DMC’s CaseNotes

Background

The dispute arose after the container vessel “Solong” collided with the anchored tanker “Stena Immaculate” off the Humber coast of the United Kingdom in March 2025. “Solong” was a small container ship (820 TEU) with a forward spray deck that restricted visibility for crew working on deck. “Stena Immaculate” was lying at anchor with a cargo of over 220,000 barrels of jet fuel.

At the time, the Master of “Solong”, Capt Vladimir Motin, was on duty as sole officer of the watch with AB Mark Pernia on standby duty as lookout. When the collision happened, AB Pernia was at the bow, under the spray deck cover, greasing deck gear. Capt Motin neither steered nor slowed his ship, nor sounded any alarm. Accordingly, “Solong”, which was proceeding at sea speed on a largely steady course, failed to alter course or reduce speed before striking the tanker, causing a major explosion, fire, significant damage and the death of AB Pernia.

Following the casualty, Owners of “Solong” commenced limitation proceedings. Stena Interests resisted limitation, alleging that the casualty was attributable not merely to navigational negligence on the part of the Master but to systemic failures in Owners' management, safety procedures and oversight, such that Owners had committed personal acts or omissions recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result within the meaning of Article 4 of the LLMC.

The Master of “Solong” was found criminally guilty of gross negligence manslaughter and Owners of “Solong” conceded that he was guilty of a gross failure of his watchkeeping and navigation duties. However, for the reasons explained below, the Judge rejected the argument that the collision resulted from acts or omissions of Owners of “Solong” committed recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result. There was no evidential basis for such claim. The Judge made no findings of fact as to whether the Master of “Solong” was unaware of the risk ahead, however, he made a preliminary observation that the basic facts “suggest” this was a “likely explanation”.

Judgment

The Judge dealt with two key issues: (i) the “virtually unbreakable” nature of the right to limit; (ii) and whether the meaning of “such loss” in Article 4 refers to the very loss which actually resulted or that type of loss in general.

Issue 1: “virtually unbreakable” nature of the right to limit

Following the interpretative approach endorsed recently by the UK Supreme Court in The “MSC Flaminia” (No. 2) (fn.2), the Judge examined both the object and purpose of the LLMC and its travaux préparatoires.

The Judge firstly observed that the historically limited success of Article 4 challenges reflected the fact that the provision was purposely "narrowly drawn" so that the right to limit liability would be "virtually unbreakable". This conclusion was not treated as merely a judicial description of the practical difficulty of breaking limitation; rather, the travaux préparatoires revealed a deliberate rejection of a broader fault-based approach. Indeed, the Second Report of the Chairman to the Hamburg Conference (in relation to the LLMC) explained that the drafters had consciously moved away from the earlier test of “actual fault or privity”, under which limitation could be defeated by simple negligence. In preferring the test of “intent to cause loss or recklessness…with knowledge that loss would probably occur”, the legislative approach reflected a clear policy judgment: the loss of limitation should be reserved for exceptional cases analogous to wilful misconduct. As put by Gross J in The “Saint Jacques II” (fn.3), and affirmed by the Judge, it is likely that “only truly exceptional cases” will give rise to “any real prospect of defeating an owner’s right to limit” in the collision context.

The Judge secondly considered that this understanding of Article 4 had been confirmed by the IMO Unified Interpretation Resolution A.1164(32) of 2021 (“Resolution”). The Judge treated the Resolution as accepted and adopted by the states party to the LLMC, which in turn meant that the Resolution was to be taken into account as part of the primary task of interpreting Article 4 under Article 31.3(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. Paragraph 1 of the Resolution characterised the nature of the test for breaking the right to limit liability as “virtually unbreakable”, defined as “breakable only in very limited circumstances”. This was further supported by three requirements contained within the test: first, the elevated culpability standard of wilful misconduct, as opposed to mere gross negligence; second, the emphasis on insurability which elevated it from a mere collateral commercial consideration to a defining characteristic of the Article 4 threshold; and, third, that the conduct of parties other than the shipowner was irrelevant.

Issue 2: the meaning of “such loss”

As to the meaning of “such loss” in Article 4, the Judge was presented with two polar opposite interpretations. The first was the narrower interpretation which requires Owners to have had knowledge of the probability that the “said loss” would occur. The second was the broader interpretation which construes “such loss” as extending only to the “type” of loss and not the specific loss that resulted.

The Judge considered that the narrower interpretative approach aligned with the underlying purpose of Article 4—namely, the provision of an exception to a right to limit that is designed to make that right virtually unbreakable. However, several factors pointed against the narrow approach.

First, the Judge’s analysis started from the premise that the ordinary position is that a wrongdoer bears full responsibility for the consequences of its conduct. Where, therefore, limitation of liability is permitted by way of an exception, such limitation nonetheless requires justification. Indeed, it appeared that the Judge’s concern related to the undesirable situation where materially indistinguishable forms of culpability were treated differently.

Simply put, if two forms of culpable conduct are materially indistinguishable in terms of the reasons that justify withdrawing limitation, then Article 4 should, where its language permits, treat them alike. A construction producing arbitrary distinctions between equivalent degrees of culpability would undermine, rather than advance, the LLMC's purpose and the narrow interpretation advanced by Owners would yield precisely such a result.

Second, the narrow interpretation is incongruous to the bar adopted in Article 4, which is set at a level analogous to the concept of wilful misconduct that negatives insurance cover. The Judge regarded the notion of insurability as key to the boundary of the limitation regime—drawing a conceptual link between insurability and the right to limit, and conversely between conduct barring limitation and conduct negativing insurability. The Judge found support in the travaux préparatoires and the Resolution. The former made clear that Article 4 was intended to establish a culpability threshold analogous to that governing the loss of insurance cover for wilful misconduct. The latter made that link explicit at paragraph 1(b)(iii), which prescribes that loss of entitlement to limit liability “should begin where the level of culpability is such that insurability ends”.

The material examined by the Judge revealed a clear commercial preoccupation with the broader issue of maritime risk allocation - namely, the fact that limitation of liability ensures that catastrophic losses remain commercially manageable, whilst insurance distributes those losses across the mutual market and its reinsurers. It followed from that commercial premise that the point at which an owner's conduct becomes so culpable that it ceases to be insurable also represents the point at which the law ceases to justify the protective benefits of limitation. Article 4 therefore marks the point at which a loss ceases to be part of the ordinary pool of insurable maritime risk and becomes the personal responsibility of the wrongdoer.

Examined cumulatively, the Judge ultimately adopted the broader interpretation of “such loss”—as understood in analogy with wilful misconduct and requiring an intentional act causing that type of loss, or reckless conduct accompanied by actual knowledge that such type of loss would probably result.

Comment

The decision is firstly practically significant as it enlarges the rather limited case-law on the invocation of an Article 4 defence and thus provides more certainty to market participants on how such defence can be engaged.  The clearest manifestation of this is that claimants seeking to break limitation must focus their investigations on the conduct attributable to the shipowner itself, rather than simply demonstrating a causative connection to any serious negligence. As explained by the Judge, Stena Interests’ Article 4 defence inherently depended on a fanciful notion that someone in senior management at Owners actually knew that “Solong” was operated and navigated in ways that were dangerous, thus rendering it probable that she would have a collision on one of her North Sea transits.

To avoid such outcomes, prospective claimants must focus not on speculation but rather on concrete evidence that supports intention and or recklessness with knowledge that the type of loss was likely. While such evidence extends to evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial, the decision makes clear that Article 4 is not a fishing expedition whereby a claimant should be allowed to proceed to trial simply because disclosure might later uncover evidence capable of undermining the right to limit liability.

More widely, the decision is of further normative significance because of the Judge’s analysis of the function and purpose of Article 4 generally. In considering Stena Interests’ construction of Article 4 as capable of producing distinctions devoid of principled justification, the Judge’s purposive interpretation and analysis of the travaux préparatoires demonstrated that the drafters intended Article 4 to identify a threshold analogous to the point at which wilful misconduct renders losses uninsurable. Of particular interest is the Judge’s treatment of the Resolution as having effectively created a hierarchy of culpability that uses insurance consequences as the criterion of where limitation should cease to be allowed.

The placing of insurability at the centre of the analysis has the potential to reinstate predictability and greater certainty in such limitation questions. Indeed, the position is sufficiently clear: catastrophic maritime losses remain capable of being commercially absorbed through limitation and insurance, except where the shipowner's own conduct crosses the boundary into wilful misconduct or knowing recklessness.

Footnote 1: “[Owners] shall not be entitled to limit [their] liability if it is proved that the loss resulted from [their] personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result.”

Footnote 2: MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Conti II Container Schiffahrts-GmbH & Co KG MS [2025] UKSC 14 – see DMC case note at MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. v Conti 11. Container Schiffahrts –Others (The "MSC Flaminia" (No. 2)) - DMC

Footnote 3: [2002] EWHC 2452 (Admlty)

Footnote 4: [2001] EWCA Civ 1055